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Introduction
The complexity of the interaction between multiple stakeholders in a market often requires the 
intervention of regulation to counter the effects of imbalances and imperfections. The rationale for 
regulation includes the need to prevent markets from failing because of an asymmetry of 
information between the provider of the product and the customer and to counter opportunistic 
behaviour that may give rise to the problem of moral hazard (Staschen 2010). However, regulation 
has to be considered within the political economic context of that market. To this end an 
understanding of regulatory policy in relation to public interest is important. Considering the 
effect of the recent financial crisis and the rapid evolution of financial frameworks and financial 
legislation, it is clear that much of these reactive interventions were aimed at avoiding future 
market failure. Although the rationale for regulation is to pursue stability and to protect markets 
from failing, financial markets in particular place emphasis on public interest theory (Pistor 2012). 
This proposes that regulation is supplied in response to the demand of the public for the correction 
of inefficient or inequitable market practices. The concept of regulatory policy approaches public 
interest not only from a defensive position but also considers a paradigm where alignment 
between political and economic objectives and behaviour is encouraged and rewarded. For this 
reason the regulator’s objectives include a performative element of promoting social welfare or 
promoting the internalisation of normative behaviour of those regulated (Etienne 2010).
An example of the promotion of social welfare by the regulator is the desire to improve access to 
the market. In a financial context, the quest for greater financial inclusion has been receiving 
global attention through the G20 and World Bank (2015). Financial exclusion remains a social and 
economic concern, with many countries reflecting a formal account penetration by adults lower 
than 50%. Globally, 2.5 billion adults do not have an account at a financial institution, with most 
of these residing in developing countries (Demirgüç-Kunt & Klapper 2013:289).
Financial inclusion and regulation to stabilise markets might appear as a trade-off, but research 
shows that greater financial inclusion may enhance the stability of the financial market through 
increased fairness, efficiency and transparency (Hannig & Jansen 2010). Considering the regulatory 
objective to achieve greater access to financial services, the relationship between institutions 
responsible for bringing the products to market and the regulator is relevant. As markets change 
and regulations increase, it may provide significant opportunities and threats to the industry. This 
requires a response from the business in terms of the regulator’s changing requirements (Veal & 
Mouzas 2011). To ensure an effective interaction between the regulator and the industry, the 
This study explores how the financial regulator through interaction with the long-term 
insurance industry can give effect to greater market inclusion and financial stability. It follows 
a qualitative approach and we interview both industry representatives and the regulator. The 
results show that there is a possible tension between the regulatory objectives of market 
stability and financial inclusion and that an unbalanced focus on either objective could 
adversely affect the other. It suggests that the best way to ensure this balance is for industry, 
the regulator and government to coframe issues, rather than being obliged to rely on the 
regulator to draft regulation in isolation. The entry level (base of the pyramid) insurance 
market may require a different paradigm to ‘usual’ insurance constructs and this requires a 
more innovative approach from all stakeholders. The findings highlight strategic measures 
that may assist regulators in giving effect to greater market inclusion without prejudicing the 
stability of the market.
Regulatory interaction with the long-term 
insurance industry in pursuit of market 
stability and financial inclusion
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industry needs to be proactive. They need to understand the 
intentions of the regulator and shape the rules in their 
networks accordingly (Veal & Mouzas 2011).
This article examines how a financial regulator through 
interaction with the long-term insurance industry can give 
effect to greater market inclusion and financial stability in 
South Africa. It analyses the potential conflict between the 
regulator’s objective of greater market stability and its 
objective of promoting access, as well as what the most 
effective means of interaction is between the regulator and 
the industry. Although the research is exploratory in nature 
and was undertaken in the context of financial services, there 
may be general applicability in similar regulated and utility 
markets.
Literature review
‘Regulation’ typically refers to a collective of rules, directives 
and legislation, combined with the power of a regulator to 
monitor compliance. It is accepted that the general purpose 
of regulation of any market lies within the concept of control. 
Control does not denote market power of a regulator with 
reference to its industry but rather refers to the application of 
prescribed rules, procedures or principles to avoid market 
failure and to protect the end consumer.
In terms of game theory, where one party (the firm) acts as an 
agent or representative in the market on behalf of its principal 
(the end customer), it is reasonable to deduce that, irrespective 
of their agency relationship, both parties may attempt to 
maximise their respective utilities or self-interests, resulting 
in the agent not always acting in the best interest of its 
principal (Laffont & Martimort 2009). The utility function 
and the relative position of wealth and power of the agent 
and principal will dictate the degree and breadth of regulation 
required. In such instances the role of the state is to govern 
the asymmetry of information (and accompanied power 
imbalances), not necessarily in an attempt to bring forth a 
perfect equilibrium between the principal and agent but to 
offset the gains that the agent may obtain at the cost of the 
principal against a particular regulatory incentive for the 
agent to uphold such regulation, such as rewarding the agent 
for particular actions or sanctioning penalties for others. 
Firms have better information about opportunities and risks 
than their individual clients because of the fact that it is 
expensive for clients to attain the same level of information, 
and thus firms can behave opportunistically, giving rise to 
the problem of moral hazard (Staschen 2010).
Linked to the phenomenon of imperfect markets are 
monopolies and oligopolies. These lead to inefficient outcomes 
because these markets are not competitive. In a monopolistic 
regime normal market forces that would regulate the quantity 
of a product and its price do not exist (Basso, Figueroa & 
Vasquez 2016), requiring a regulator to either set price limits 
or determine the quantity of a product supplied. Kearney and 
Merrill (1998) state that the trend towards the end of the 20th 
century was that the role of regulators moved away from 
complete pervasive control to that of regulating firms 
horizontally and setting regulation to maximise competition 
between firms, based on the assumption that competition in 
itself may to a large degree be sufficient to protect the end 
user. Regulation therefore moved in the direction of not only 
the vertical prescription of government interests and aligning 
the behaviour of industries in accordance with these views but 
also into the private sector to ensure that competition between 
firms was maximised to avoid monopolistic behaviour. Thus 
the objectives for regulation, within the context of public 
interest theory, can be summarised as follows: to promote 
safety and soundness; guard against systemic risk that can 
lead to market failure; establish a competitive market and 
protect consumers.
Regulation of financial markets
The distinct features of financial markets, and the immediacy 
of the effect of a failed financial market on the economy, 
distinguish them from other markets (Stiglitz 1993). 
Moreover, as a result of the cost of regulation, such as the cost 
of reporting or compliance, or the costs of entry to the market 
and the extent to which these costs are passed on to the end 
customer, the rationale and objectives for financial regulation 
are important.
Stability of financial markets
The problem of moral hazard is particularly prevalent in 
financial markets where the cost of information collection is 
immediate and high, incentivising the agents (firms) of the 
principals (customers) to take hidden actions or act 
opportunistically. Llewellyn (1999) states that a regulation-
free financial market environment imposes costs on 
consumers, as they are not able to ascertain the true costs of a 
product or its nature or the basis upon which it is offered. He 
suggests that the rationale for regulation in this regard is not 
to restrict or replace competition but in fact to enhance it by 
offsetting market imperfections, which may compromise 
consumer welfare. This concept underlies the differentiation 
between a micro-prudential and macro-prudential approach 
to regulation, where the latter is aimed at safeguarding the 
financial system as a whole through regulation (Hanson, 
Kashyap & Stein 2011).
Staschen (2010) indicates that the key objectives of regulation 
in financial services are aimed at serving public interest 
through stabilising the financial system, on the assumption 
that public interest is best served through governmental 
interference and regulation. However, Edgar (2009), with 
reference to the Basel implementation in the banking sector, 
warns that a reasonable regulator in a financial market 
should guard against increasing regulation of the financial 
system, as it may lead to further financial exclusion through 
added complexity and costs.
Financial inclusion
The importance of financial inclusion has been highlighted 
by the G20 and World Bank (World Bank 2015) and is viewed 
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as an important strategy to achieve financial growth and 
social development (Terzi 2015). It is defined as ‘the process 
of ensuring access to financial services and timely and 
adequate credit where needed by vulnerable groups, such as 
weaker sections and low-income groups at affordable cost’ 
(Kumar 2013:6).
Financial inclusion is argued to stimulate growth through a 
greater pooling of funds, which allows for an improved 
allocation thereof and reduction of poverty (Claessens 2006). 
The reasons for financial exclusion (De Koker & Jentzsch 
2013) can be attributed to affordability, accessibility or 
eligibility, with the latter referring to individual 
disqualification because of, for instance insufficient proof of 
identification. However, these reasons are put forward from 
the perspective of the customer. An alternative view is that 
lower income individuals are often perceived to be difficult 
to serve by suppliers, or that available products fail their 
needs. Further perceptions are that the risks associated with 
these individuals are difficult to manage and that existing 
regulations pose barriers to entry to the market (Aduda & 
Kalunda 2012).
A recent article by Marti and Scherer (2016) explores how 
financial regulation may enhance social welfare. They 
propose that inclusive financial regulation is dependent on 
institutional design that includes all affected social groups. 
Rather than focusing on a broader technocratic regulatory 
approach that overemphasises stability and efficiency within 
the market, they build on the theory suggested by Schneiberg 
and Bartley (2010:34), who state that inclusionary financial 
regulation should not merely interfere with financial markets 
but should ‘constitute’ financial markets. Terzi (2015) explains 
that too much regulation or insufficient synergies are partially 
to blame for financial exclusion resulting from increased 
costs and individual disqualification. He proposes that 
policies in pursuit of financial inclusion should be linked to 
macroeconomic stability. Apart from improved information 
required by the regulator in terms of what Marti and Scherer 
(2016:313) emphasise as ‘management research’ of all 
representatives in the market, a deviation is required from 
the normal path that investigates how the regulator can 
improve stability and efficiency of those already in the 
market. The literature therefore shows that that both the 
avoidance of market failure and the realisation of improved 
financial inclusion should be key objectives of the regulator.
Interaction between stability and financial inclusion
The risk associated with poorer customers, such as the risk of 
default and of failing to sell low margin products at 
sufficiently high volumes, implies a trade-off between an 
increase in financial inclusion and market stability. Hannig 
and Jansen (2010:22) suggest that the question of whether an 
increased focus on financial inclusion can undermine the 
stability of a financial market is relevant, because the origin 
of the crisis in the subprime market at least initially suggested 
destabilising spillovers from the lower end of the market to 
the remainder of the system. Of particular concern in many 
developing countries is the additional regulatory uncertainty 
arising from the rapidly proliferating, technology-driven 
policy solutions that boost small-scale transactions flowing 
through the national payment system.
Khan (2011:12), however, states that the regulatory objectives 
of stability and financial inclusion are so interrelated that 
their coexistence is in fact mandatory. Financial inclusion 
results in a ‘deeper, more diversified and resilient financial 
system as well as healthier corporate and household sectors 
which can enhance financial stability’. This view is supported 
by Prasad (2010) and Morgan and Pontines (2014), who 
suggest that inadequate access by small-scale entrepreneurs 
to credit has an adverse effect on employment and the 
stability of the economy.
Considering the regulatory intent to prevent market failure 
and instability, who should be responsible to give effect to 
greater financial inclusion? According to Khan (2011:13), this 
is a financial policy issue that forms part of the regulatory 
objective requiring formal financial systems to deliver 
‘affordable financial services with greater efficiency’. 
Whatever the regulatory framework and interaction between 
the regulator and its regulated industry, he proposes a 
regulatory imperative to establish greater financial literacy 
and awareness, with the understanding that prudential 
regulation remain important to ensure that these initiatives 
remain commensurate with the risks of greater financial 
inclusion. Demirgüç-Kunt (2014) states that the government 
has to focus on three areas to promote financial inclusion: 
technological innovation, to reduce transaction costs; product 
design, to ensure products are appropriate and affordable; 
and financial literacy, to ensure users understand the concepts 
and promote responsible uptake of products.
Kenya provides an interesting case of the balance between 
financial stability and financial inclusion in emerging markets 
that have been sought through a regulatory framework. The 
example of the branchless banking concept rolled out in 
Kenya and the innovation of M-Pesa required the regulator 
to revisit the concept of individual disqualification and 
allowed mobile banking customers to be exempt from the 
documentation requirements imposed by banks (Demirgüç-
Kunt & Klapper 2013).
The political economy of regulation in the 
financial industry
Considering the rationale and objectives for regulation as 
discussed above, the relationship between political outcomes 
and their effect on supply constitutes what is commonly 
referred to as the ‘political economy’ – the application of 
economic analysis to the study of political processes 
(Schnellenbach & Schubert 2015). The concept explains how 
the government operates within society on the assumption 
that it is considered to help regulate society to reduce the 
impact of any economic and social crisis, as the failure thereof 
may lead to unstable social relations (Wan & Bramwell 2015). 
At the same time government needs to maintain legitimacy, 
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without which it will be unable to regulate the economy or 
maintain social order. In this context government has a 
responsibility towards social structures and therefore exhibits 
‘essential common elements such as formal authority and 
legitimacy, central decision-making and coercion’ (Rosenau 
& Czempiel 1992:213).
Within the context of political economy, the concept of 
regulatory capture should be considered, referring to a 
phenomenon where regulated firms gain considerable power 
over its regulator, and this is often more common in the 
context of oligopolies. This happens when the regulator 
oversympathises with the firms it is supposed to regulate. 
Staschen (2010) proposes that regulatory capture may lead to 
socially suboptimal shifts towards higher producer surplus 
at the expense of consumer surplus but points out that a 
degree of capture will be inevitable. What is important is the 
subtlety of the nature such influence may present. It may lead 
to or develop out of a relationship between a particular firm 
and the regulator whereby industry knowledge, which is 
vital for the regulator’s effectiveness, is channelled (Boyer & 
Ponce 2012). This may either lead to a sympathetic 
relationship towards that firm or general regulatory 
forbearance (‘over-regulation’). The regulator must guard 
against becoming too enmeshed with regulated firms, 
allowing for their interests to be elevated beyond public 
interest. This is what Samarajiva (2001) refers to as ‘legitimacy 
of a regulator’ – to act and to be seen to act in the public 
interest – and to construct what is deemed to be in the public 
interest through a participatory process.
Although public interest theory assumes that government 
has the best interest of society at heart, it simplifies the 
complex political economy process, where legitimate social 
goals are in practice measured against the objectives of 
particular stakeholders (Loayza, Oviedo & Servén 2004). 
Regulators may respond to business demands for many 
reasons, including self-interest as a result of lobbying or in an 
effort to protect existing business based on the importance of 
firms to the economy (Shaffer 2010). Considering that 
regulation is often shaped by policy responses, the 
information flow between regulators and industry in relation 
to their respective motives is influenced largely by the type of 
regulatory intervention.
The literature makes mention of certain tools that can be 
employed by the regulator to obtain information to close the 
asymmetry gap. The typical command-and-control style of 
regulatory intervention is stifling to business cooperation 
and information flows from business to the regulator (Malik 
2014). Self-reporting rules, on the other hand, fit in with the 
‘new governance agenda’ for private institutions to take the 
regulatory objectives on board (Etienne 2015:259). Although 
information flows are improved with self-reporting (in 
comparison to inspections or traditional command-and-
control relationships), this is dependent on incentives to 
firms. One of the ways in which regulators may overcome the 
possible disparity in motives between themselves and their 
industry is to attempt to alter the motivations of regulatees. 
This has been referred to as ‘relational signals’ as a result of 
information exchanged in repeated interactions (Etienne 
2013:33). Through repeated interactions, the regulator and 
regulatees learn to understand their relationship through the 
same lenses. Although this will not lead to alignment of the 
goals, they will develop a common understanding of their 
relationship. This helps parties to know when positive or 
negative signals are sent, and regulators and regulatees use 
these signals to interact with one another.
Van der Heijden and De Jong (2013:4) discuss the various 
degrees of government enforcement and private sector 
involvement of different regulatory regimes. Using building 
regulation as a context, they refer to ‘enforcement strategies’ 
to describe the tactical choices made by regulators to enforce 
regulation. ‘Deterrence-based strategies’ refer to deterring 
non-compliance before it has happened or instituting 
sanction after a rule has been broken. Compliance-based 
strategies are aimed at ‘the spontaneous obedience of 
regulations’, through focusing on a desire to comply as a 
result of moral disapproval of non-compliance. Regulatory 
enforcement and interaction can be categorised by 
government involvement with the traditional command-
and-control style and complete voluntarism without 
government intervention at either end of the continuum. 
Self-regulation may include a varying degree of government 
intervention, which in itself leads to an ambiguous definition. 
It may mean, for instance, that firms control their own 
membership and behaviour with a certain degree of 
government intervention. It is this degree of intervention, 
directly from government or independent regulatory bodies, 
that leads to dissimilar characteristics of these regimes. In 
general, the advantages of self-regulation include expert 
knowledge and expertise, with easier access to relevant 
information. On the other hand, self-regulation may lead to 
accountability issues and an increase in regulatory capture. 
Van der Heijden and De Jong (2013) conclude that it may be 
easier to enforce clear rules-based regulation, as the 
parameters are clear. Command-and-control enforcement, 
however, is expensive and may not incentivise regulatees to 
comply with the scope of the regulation.
Financial regulation within the South African 
context
As a result of apartheid and the imbalance in economic 
power between various groups in South Africa, market 
competition remains imperfect and the industry is 
dominated by an oligopolistic structure. Although informal 
systems offer much wider access to financial services, the 
ability of individuals to compete in the formal financial 
market remains limited because of ‘excessive regulation, 
lack of competition or information asymmetry between 
borrowers and lenders’ (World Bank 2015). According to the 
World Bank (2015), 54% of South African adults have access 
to a financial product. It finds that more than 12 million 
adults lack a basic bank account, normally the first basic 
step to financial inclusion. Furthermore, only 35% of adults 
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amongst the poorest 20% of income earners have a formal 
account. Considering South Africa’s political past, financial 
inclusion has gained recognition as one of the main pillars 
of the development agenda in South Africa and plays a vital 
role in the ongoing transformation and development of 
society.
The financial system in South Africa needs to be looked at 
within a political economy of high levels of poverty, 
inequality and unemployment. We therefore find a situation 
where the country’s financial sector is regarded as well 
regulated, characterised by strong financial markets, ranking 
seventh out of 144 countries in financial market development 
but with a dichotomy referred to by Staschen (1999:40) as ‘the 
coexistence of a modern “first world” financial sector and a 
large informal and semi-formal “third world” financial 
sector’. The inequality brought about by the racial divides 
and geographic differentiation of wealth resulted in an 
economic duality characterised by institutions and regulation 
associated with developed markets amidst socio-economic 
issues common to developing markets, such as the uneven 
distribution of wealth and a large degree of financial 
exclusion. This is a challenge for the future development of 
the financial sector in the country.
The financial regulator in South Africa
The principal objectives of financial regulation in South 
Africa are to ensure that the financial system is safe and to 
secure confidence in the system. The current regulatory 
financial architecture in South Africa allows for a distinct 
demarcation between the banking sector, regulated by the 
South African Reserve Bank (SARB) in terms of the Banks 
Act and SARB Act, and the non-banking sector (long- and 
short-term insurance, collective investments and retirement 
funds), regulated by the Financial Services Board (FSB). 
Table 1 shows the current demarcation between prudential 
and market conduct regulation in South Africa with the 
respective regulators and industries. It demonstrates the 
four main bodies that affect financial regulation in South 
Africa [the SARB, FSB, National Credit Regulator (NCR) 
and the National Consumer Commission (NCC)] and the 
respective entities that they oversee (in the cells below each 
heading). The FSB is an independent body appointed to 
oversee the non-banking financial services industry and is 
fully funded by the industry through fees and levies. The 
Minister of Finance has final authority in all financial 
regulation.
On 13 February 2013 the South African Regulatory Reform 
Steering Committee chaired by the Minister of Finance 
published a document entitled ‘Implementing a Twin Peaks 
model of financial regulation in South Africa’ (RSA 2013) for 
public comment. It encapsulated the principles contained in 
the original policy document, ‘A safer financial sector to 
serve South Africa better’ (RSA 2011) (commonly referred to 
as ‘the Red Book’), which culminated in the Financial Sector 
Regulation Bill (RSA 2015), which was passed by parliament 
on 22 June 2017. The bill allows for a dual regulator in terms 
whereof the prudential authority for both banks and non-
banking entities will vest in the SARB to ensure the required 
alignment for financial soundness and institutional stability 
of the entire financial system. Market conduct regulation will 
vest with the Financial Sector Conduct Authority, which will 
be responsible for the strengthening of financial customer 
protection and promoting the integrity of financial markets, 
consumer education and financial inclusion. This is a 
significant step away from the current framework, in which 
both market conduct and prudential regulation are shared by 
the SARB, the FSB, the NCR and the NCC. The Reserve Bank 
will oversee financial stability within a policy framework 
agreed with the Minister of Finance.
The Red Book contains four cabinet-approved policy 
objectives:
•	 the need to improve market conduct;
•	 the need to combat financial crime;
•	 the need to strengthen financial stability;
•	 the need to widen access to financial services.
Through giving regulatory stature to the intent to strengthen 
financial stability while simultaneously widening access to 
financial services, these policy objectives have been elevated 
to new heights. Figure 1 illustrates the Twin Peaks model, 
aimed at creating a more stable financial sector, underscoring 
the principles of the Red Book.
One of the key issues raised in public submissions in 2013 to 
the then Financial Services Laws General Amendment Bill 
involved the issue of information exchange. The FSB’s view 
at the time was that its mandate required information sharing 
specifically to protect the public and to ensure safe and fair 
financial services markets. It is apparent that current 
legislation does not prescribe when and how industry will be 
consulted to collaborate in finding a suitable way forward on 
a particular issue. The FSB’s draft Code of Consultation 
TABLE 1: Current financial regulatory framework.
Prudential regulation Market conduct regulation
SA Reserve Bank Financial Services Board Financial Services Board National Credit Regulator National Consumer Commission
Registrar of Banks Registrar of Pension Funds, 
friendly societies, long-term 
insurance, short-term insurance, 
securities services, collective 
investment schemes 
Prudential Registrar
Registrar of Financial Services 
Providers 
- -
Banks Some non-banks (e.g. insurance 
companies) Securities markets
Banks
Non-banks
Securities markets
Credit providers including banks 
and non-banks
Banks
Non-financial services firms
Source: Adapted from Bird 2013
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makes reference to the FSB’s duty to consult all materially 
affected stakeholders on future proposals.
One key stakeholder is the Association of Savings and 
Investment South Africa (ASISA 2015), which acts as the 
industry body for the majority of South Africa’s ‘asset 
managers, collective investment scheme management 
companies, linked investment service providers, multi-
managers and life insurance companies’. ASISA’s mandate is 
to strengthen relationships with key stakeholders and to 
remain a trusted partner to these stakeholders in the financial 
services industry. ASISA represents its members through 
various standing committees and working groups. Industry 
representatives are appointed on these working groups and 
standing committees to convey their company-specific 
interests and influence the regulator as a combined industry. 
As membership to ASISA is voluntary, non-conformation to 
their codes, guidelines and principles is not penalised. 
However, membership implies agreed compliance, which 
makes the industry body influential as a conduit between the 
regulator and industry.
In concluding this section, we reiterate the particular 
challenges presented by South Africa’s financial development, 
which requires a simultaneous focus on financial inclusion 
and consumer interests within the wider context of 
competitiveness and the general protection against market 
failure. Although the literature is clear on the objectives of 
regulation to enhance market stability through responsive 
regulation following a risk approach to institutions, 
regulatory policy to promote market inclusion requires a 
macro-prudential approach providing for effective relational 
signalling to its industry.
Research methodology
The research followed a qualitative approach to gain insight 
into the strategies of the regulator and its interaction with 
industry. The research was initiated through desk research to 
gain a greater understanding of the theoretical rationale for 
regulation and its objectives. The interview schedule was 
organised around the four major areas relevant to the 
research: firstly, the purpose and effect of regulation; 
secondly, the objective of financial inclusion; thirdly, the 
possible tension between the rationale for regulation and 
inclusion; and lastly, the interaction between the regulator 
and the industry. The semi-structured interviews with 
predetermined themes and initial questions allowed for 
some structure and ensured relevance.
The population consisted of the long-term insurance services 
industry in South Africa regulated by the FSB. Considering the 
vastness of financial services and in particular the nature of 
the regulatory framework, it would have been ideal to include 
respondents across all spheres of the industry, including 
consumers. However, to avoid embarking on a research 
process that might lack sufficient depth to warrant confidence 
and reliability, the population earmarked for the study 
comprised long-term insurers (LTIs) in South Africa. According 
to the KPMG report of 2014 the largest five LTIs in South 
Africa held 72% of the total market capital of the LTI industry 
and comprised Sanlam, Old Mutual, MMI Group Ltd, Liberty 
and Discovery. The sample consisted of three of these five 
insurers, the industry association and regulatory stakeholders.
Respondents were selected based on their seniority and 
experience within their particular firms or their involvement 
in representing their firms at the regulator or their 
involvement in the implementation of new regulation, as 
well as senior executives at the industry body (ASISA) and 
the regulator (FSB) (see Table 2).
Each of the interviews was recorded with permission and 
transcribed. Each transcript was codified through thematic 
analysis by applying open coding. Where more than one 
interview for a particular organisation was recorded, these 
interviews were grouped together to obtain an organisational 
view. The next step in the process was the identification of 
trends between respondents.
To ensure research credibility, various strategies were 
employed. Interviewees were contacted again to clarify and 
confirm their views and check their comments for accuracy – 
a process of respondent validation. Triangulation was insured 
by testing the findings from multiple perspectives. This was 
achieved through the utilisation of various sources, including 
views from firms in the industry, the regulator and the 
industry body. Furthermore, the study relied on policy 
South African
Reserve Bank 
(SARB)
Banks, insurers,
financial 
intermediaries,
rerement funds,  
administrators,
investment 
instuons and
financial markets
Financial Sector
Conduct 
Authority (FSCA)
Council of
financial
regulators
Source: Bird 2013
FIGURE 1: Future financial regulatory framework under Twin Peaks.
TABLE 2: Profile of respondents.
Organisation Identity reference
Insurer 1 In1 R1
Insurer 2 In1 R2
Insurer 2 In2 R1
Insurer 3 In3 R1
ASISA IB1 R1
ASISA IB1 R2
FSB Reg R1
FSB Reg R2
FSB Reg R3
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documents and public documents to verify comments. As the 
research occurred within a particular context (financial 
services within South Africa) it cannot be stated that the 
findings would be relevant to all other regulatory settings. 
However, there may be a high degree of applicability in 
similar contexts, such as regulated financial services in 
emerging economies, where there is a need for greater 
financial inclusion.
Research findings and discussion
Financial stability and regulation
Our respondents were not in favour of self-regulation. They 
explained that regulation existed because firms could not rely 
on each other to comply with self-enforced rules, which could 
result in the loss of competitive advantage and market stability. 
It was therefore noteworthy that respondents were in favour 
of a formal regulatory approach subject to the regulator’s 
enforcement powers, as there appeared to be insufficient trust 
between firms to comply with self-regulation.
Those respondents familiar with the current implementation 
of prudential regulation under solvency and adequacy 
measurement recognised this as an important measure to 
protect the market. However, both the industry body and 
insurers expressed concern that an overemphasis on market 
stability and prudential regulation may come at the cost of 
the other objectives, such as consumer protection or financial 
inclusion. The concern was that it inadvertently detracts 
from the focus that is required for improved inclusion. As 
stated by one insurer, ‘You could have an over-focus on 
stability, which would kill off innovation’ (In2 R2-17).
The regulator explained that the issues of stability and 
inclusion were not separate issues, as the focus on market 
stability had consumer protection as its goal. The objectives 
of market stability and consumer protection are intrinsically 
linked and what may appear as the ostensible emphasis on 
market stability is, according to the regulator, an element of 
consumer protection. The regulator was of the view that the 
split in market conduct and prudential oversight under the 
Twin Peaks legislation would allow for a greater 
proportionality of the different objectives, including that of 
inclusion.
It is common cause that legislative changes come at a cost. 
Typically these would include system changes, resources and 
the general costs of having to do something additional or 
differently, or to refrain from doing something that previously 
may have resulted in profit. ASISA viewed the cost of 
compliance as difficult to ascertain and stated that the real 
figures were not known:
‘I suppose I never really get actual figures, and also compliance 
costs are always something that’s difficult to measure. Because 
putting a system in place you can kind of give an amount to, or 
resources you can kind [of] give an amount to, but not the time 
spent, not just by the compliance personnel but by the people 
that need to be trained and all the processes and procedures that 
go down the line’. (IB1 R2-19)
One insurer estimated their compliance bill for a certain 
segment of their business to be extraordinarily high, stating 
the following:
‘Just speaking on behalf of our corporate business, which is the 
one that I have the oversight over currently, so that’s the 
employee benefit space, retirement funds and value funds, etc. 
This year, of our total investment in projects in the business, 40% 
of that spent was spent purely on regulatory projects. That is a 
significant amount. And that’s just regulation changing, where 
we have to update our systems, we have to do a whole lot of 
training, we have to spend a huge amount educating the advisor 
force out there and communicating to customs. And that is 40%. 
I mean, that is significant’. (In2 R1-7)
The study showed that the two large insurers, focusing on the 
lower end of the insurance market specifically, shared the view 
that the South African financial services market was not over-
regulated, irrespective of the plethora of existing and planned 
regulation. As stated by a senior legal advisor of one insurer:
‘You know, there’s a general complaint that we are over-
regulated, but we are not over-regulated. We are not even close 
to being over-regulated. We are under-regulated comparative to 
other countries. It’s pointless to have an attitude that regulation 
is in the way; it is better to have an attitude, ‘Regulation is here; 
let’s use it as an advantage’. (In2 R2-100)
This was confirmed by a senior insurance executive, who 
stated, ‘we don’t operate in a ridiculously onerous compliance 
environment, maybe in the financial advice space a bit, but in 
the financial advice space I kind of feel like it’s necessary’ 
(In1 R1-31).
Irrespective of the general belief that the industry was not 
over-regulated, the current cost of compliance was still 
perceived to be a barrier to market entry. One of the concerns 
expressed at the entry level of the market was that the 
regulatory requirements were out of sync with the real risk 
the industry was exposed to at this level:
‘I think compliance is necessary, I think it should be embedded. 
It is not the cost of compliance that I’m worried about; it’s the 
cost of inappropriate compliance that I am worried about, this 
wallpapered compliance, where we think that people money 
launder at R100 a month’. (In2 R1-29)
The sentiment that the high cost of compliance was a barrier to 
financial inclusion was summarised as follows by one insurer:
‘In rand terms the cost of compliance is just the same as everyone 
else. But the actual cost of compliance isn’t [in] rand terms. The 
cost of compliance is that the regulations are not designed for the 
market; they are designed for a sophisticated market’. (In2 R2-27)
The insurers confirmed that compliance requirements were 
often imposed for customer protection but that the current 
focus did not allow for increased financial inclusion:
‘The greater your customer protection, the higher your barrier to 
entry. The higher the barrier to entry, the more the person who 
gets into the system needs money to survive; that means they all 
go for the top end of the market because that’s where the money 
is’. (In2 R2-67)
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Regulation and access to the market
The regulator’s view, as a starting point, was that its primary 
role in relation to greater financial access was to create an 
environment conducive to financial inclusion. It did not see 
its role as establishing markets but rather that it needed to 
ensure that regulation did not promote unintended barriers 
for the financially excluded to enter the market
However, the industry argued that the regulator was not 
meeting its mandate to create a regulatory framework or an 
enabling environment at the lower end of the market. Two of 
the major insurers and the industry body alluded to an 
alternative paradigm required to meet the needs of those 
who currently found themselves excluded from the financial 
services sector. They suggested that financial inclusion in 
South Africa required an overhaul of existing structures, 
processes and definitions to cater for those at the fringes of 
financial inclusion, rather than attempting to utilise the 
mainstream understanding of sophisticated financial 
services:
‘I still everyday see us re-treading upper market constructs into 
the emerging market. There is very little knowledge and 
understanding of the informal financial instruments that 
operate in the market. And where we do notice them, we 
immediately jump towards trying to formalise them. We are 
stuck in our definition of what a financial product should look 
like and it is largely Western, upper market-driven constructs’. 
(In2 R1-49)
A common theme arising from the coded interviews was 
related to insurers stating that it was the expressed intention 
of the regulator to set an enabling environment for inclusion 
that the industry was not seeing in practice. Responses 
reflected that both the industry body and insurers appeared 
to detect reluctance on the part of the regulator to facilitate 
the required conversation in this regard. As stated by the 
insurance body:
‘From the sort of lower income market side, we have been trying 
to engage with the FSB for a long time and they don’t seem that 
interested. They are just not very open to … they said there’s 
been a lot of conflict with the industry saying everything you’re 
putting in place is first world, and you’ve got first world markets 
and third world markets in South Africa and you’re not looking 
at the reality of the situation, we don’t have the data, we don’t 
have this, we don’t have that, you’re just being insistent that you 
have to have it. So there’s that tension and the regulator doesn’t 
seem to be open to talk about what practical steps can be taken’. 
(IB1 R2-67)
One of the respondents focusing solely on the lower end of 
the market stated:
Trying to apply middle market regulation to entry level market 
products – now you must try and find someone in the rural areas 
with a CFA … the regulator’s role should be to remove barriers’. 
(In1 R1-46)
The responses showed recognition that the trust relationship 
between firms in the industry and the regulator had 
improved. However, these firms did not feel empowered to 
explore solutions outside the realm of what they were 
currently offering, in fear of regulatory reproach:
‘Part of that cost issue is regulation, which means that you can’t 
change the structure of the product or the way it’s offered 
because regulation constrains it. It’s not all regulation’s fault; 
there are also legal constraints which are not regulatory, common 
law constraints, which can’t easily be changed. But mostly we 
are incentivised, because that’s the market, the problem is that 
you can’t get there that easily. There’s a certain amount of 
regulation risk that you have to take and pilots would help. It 
would make it easier if there was a recognised … almost like a 
recognised area where you can try something out, making the 
way the product rules work comply with the principle that the 
regulation is trying to get you and not the actual physical 
regulation itself’. (In2 R2-46)
The respondents supported the idea of a platform for all 
stakeholders to participate in experimenting with solutions. 
This implied a platform with lighter touch compliance. It 
would allow for ‘cheaper’ products designed in novel ways, 
bundled into innovative solutions or taken to the market in 
different ways. There was very little incentive for industry to 
embark on something like this without the support of the 
regulator because they feared regulatory contempt and these 
pilots could be very expensive for a firm to run. Furthermore, 
considering the constraints of competition regulation, the role 
of the industry body to ensure that firms were not colluding 
but presented a solution that would be beneficial for the 
market in general was important. The need to overcome the 
current constraints laid down by the Competition Commission 
in allowing industry to find novel solutions was highlighted. 
The regulator indicated that there may be a need for 
developing incubators to experiment with appropriate 
products with a lighter compliance touch, stating:
‘… some of the stuff that’s being talked about internationally is 
allowing for a formal framework for pilots and piloting particular 
products or business models … It’s very early days, but I think if 
one is talking about how we take inclusion forward in a way that 
allows for innovation and experimentation, but in a more 
controlled environment. Not controlled in the sense that it’s 
prohibited, but it’s allowed in an incubation phase that is subject 
to more intensive oversight’. (Reg R1-43)
Inclusion and market stability
Responses indicated that there is a potential tension between 
the regulatory objectives of financial inclusion and market 
stability but that it is possible to allow for both objectives 
simultaneously. There is an understanding that greater 
inclusion would by its very nature expand the risk associated 
with including those who up to this point have not been able 
to afford financial products. The view was expressed that the 
answer lies within being responsible when allowing for 
greater financial access and that the emphasis should be on 
obtaining the right balance between including those that are 
currently excluded but not to the extent that it allows for 
market abuse:
‘I think it’s not really financial inclusion if people are being taken 
advantage of. So giving someone a loan they can’t afford to 
repay is not financial inclusion; that’s abuse. So, I don’t think it 
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comes at a cost of financial inclusion. So for example, some of the 
most recent caps on interest rates for loans are going to exclude 
people. Now I think they’ve gone too far; I don’t think they’re 
going to implement it, I think it’s an opening gambit. So, it’s an 
easy example, but getting that cap right is a really important 
thing because if you put it too low then you create exclusion; if 
you put it too high you leave yourself open to abuse. So, it’s to 
find that balance where you protect the people enough without 
excluding them because of the way you’re protecting them’. 
(In 1 R1-76)
It therefore requires an approach amenable to establishing 
the real needs of people at the fringes of society. The industry 
body stated that the answer to dealing with this tension was 
not divorced from the issue of trust referred to earlier:
‘If we are going to give you access, how do we know that you are 
not going to abuse it? And in the entry level market I think it’s a 
very heightened concern. Because there’s asymmetry and 
because it’s the most vulnerable people. And these are the people 
that look to the state and have the greatest expectation, rightly 
so, that the state will protect them. So I think it’s that kind of 
imperative from the regulator’. (IB1 R1-92)
One of the regulator respondents stated that one should 
not view stability and inclusion as conflicting, although 
she stated that even though the concepts were related, it 
was imperative to consider their impact separately. Thus 
all the respondents acknowledged the importance of 
inclusion but that greater access should be underpinned by 
responsibility.
Information transfer between firms 
and the regulator
An important antecedent to the objectives of market stability 
and financial inclusion is the regulator holding high quality 
information about the industry. Much of the information 
relayed to the regulator is through the process of reporting, 
which typically involves insurers providing specific 
information in terms of prescribed requirements or set 
questions. The regulator recently introduced what it called 
‘thematic reviews’, referring to onsite visits to discuss specific 
topics or trends that it picks up from the industry, which it 
believed was a step forward to obtaining better information 
to inform their regulatory focus.
All of the insurer respondents concurred that effective 
information transfer required upfront engagement that 
surpassed the typical mandatory reporting. Insurers 
proposed a process for which they play an integral part of 
the framing of the issue. In relation to greater financial 
access, for instance insurers were concerned that the 
regulator would attempt to frame the issue in isolation, 
which ultimately steered the solution in a particular 
direction:
‘I think it would be nice if we went through a process of framing 
the problem. So if the regulator sees a problem, the first discourse 
I’d like is, do we also see a problem? Can we at least together 
agree that there is a problem, what is the problem and to name it 
together?’. (In2 R1-13)
There was a concern that, although the regulator focused on 
data, it might not understand the context, as it did not ask the 
right questions:
‘They’ve got plenty of data. What I don’t know is whether 
they’ve got information or insights because I don’t think that 
that data can turn into information or insights without an 
interactive conversation. You need to have a discourse. If I send 
you data, you can look at it, you can process it, but in order for 
you to achieve insights you need to ask me questions, we need to 
talk. You need to ask ‘why’ questions, not ‘what’ questions. We 
get lots of ‘what’ questions’. (In2 R2-88)
The question then arises whether the industry body should 
not take up this responsibility. The problem with this proposal 
is that ASISA collates views and often provides a moderated 
or so-called industry view to the regulator. One possible 
solution to the issue is for the industry to drive the framework 
and engage the regulator, which is the opposite of what is 
currently happening. The proposal by one of the respondents 
is the following:
‘More than anything else business wants certainty. Bad certainty 
or good certainty doesn’t matter, we want certainty. So if you 
came as a regulator and said, ‘we’ve been talking about micro-
insurance. It’s actually stalled for four years now. Do you want to 
get this thing going?’, industry through ASISA will say, ‘we’ll 
fund a 2-year project, we’ll pay for it. We’ll second people to you 
to work in National Treasury for 2 years to deliver a micro-
insurance or an access framework. We’ll pay for it. You’ve got to 
sign off on it so you will have the final veto on it, but we’ll pay 
for it. Because that gives us certainty and that’s the most precious 
commodity for business’. (IB1 R1-110)
The regulator confirmed that under Twin Peaks collaboration 
with industry is indeed high on its agenda.
It was noteworthy that there appeared to be general 
recognition that the degree of trust between the regulator and 
firms in the industry had improved but still required further 
attention. As stated by one insurer:
‘Industry is suspicious of the regulator. They are viewed (not 
surprisingly because they are the regulator, after all) as bad 
news. If they ask you a question you give it to them, but you give 
it to them because you have to. If we could trust the regulator 
and if we didn’t have things to hide then your information 
would probably flow more easily. But we have things to hide and 
the reason we have things to hide is because we do things wrong, 
but the reason why we have things to hide is because the 
regulation is either being ignored as a matter of course, one. Two, 
it’s inappropriate and is therefore being ignored because you 
can’t function with it to make your business work. Three, it’s 
being ignored because the regulator is ineffective’. (In2 R2-92)
This was echoed elsewhere by the industry body, where it 
states with reference to the FSB:
‘I don’t want to give you data because if I give you the data 
you’re going to come after me. So I think the question about data 
and which comes first: There isn’t data at the moment that allows 
anybody to form a real picture of what’s happening at a kind of 
inclusion space … So I’m not seeing how you’re going to get a 
consolidated picture’. (IB1 R1-104)
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Although not surprising considering the enforcement powers 
of the regulator, insufficient trust of the industry to engage 
the regulator on data that may assist with greater financial 
inclusion is a common concern.
The responses showed that traditional rule-based legislation 
might not be ideal to give effect to the policy of increased 
financial inclusion and that outcomes-based regulation could 
be more suitable. Hereby the action of the insurer is ultimately 
measured against the outcome it is supposed to achieve. 
Typically the regulation would define the regulator’s intent 
and contextualise it in terms of the industry. Where applicable 
this may be supplemented with traditional rules. One of the 
respondents from the regulator stated that:
‘The one thing that we got from the financial crisis is that the 
whole self-regulatory, light-touch approach was a failure. But on 
the other hand, the other end of the spectrum is also a complete 
failure. A complete regulatory, rules-based, compliance-based 
approach is also disastrous. So what the conversation has been 
and the reformed direction that we’ve been trying to communicate 
is saying is that we need to shift to something which is in a sense 
more balanced and we don’t talk about principles-based versus 
rules-based anymore … We are moving towards an outcomes-
focused approach to regulation, which has an appropriate balance 
of principles and rules that in combination allow you to achieve 
the outcomes that you want to achieve’. (Reg R1-10)
This view was aligned with international experience, such as 
in the United Kingdom, where the FSA promulgated 
outcomes-based regulation, requiring firms to show that they 
achieved these outcomes after a certain point in time. Firms 
may then define for themselves the most appropriate route to 
reach the particular outcome, considering their market. This 
was highlighted by another respondent from the regulator:
‘So in an outcomes-based approach one has a little bit more 
flexibility on how one wants to apply the concept of 
proportionality. So depending on the nature, scale and 
complexity of the business you may apply the requirements 
slightly differently. With rules the drawback is: whether you are 
small or big, whether you have high risk or not, that is what you 
need to apply with. So I think from an outcomes-based 
perspective, it could contribute to faster and greater financial 
inclusion because in principle, each person can apply his own 
judgement to make sure that there is consistency in the 
application’. (Reg R2-63)
Conclusion
The results support the views of Dewing and Russell (2004) 
that regulations in financial services are necessary to prevent 
market failure but may result in a proliferation of complex 
rules, possibly resulting in overshooting by the regulator, 
which in turn may cause instability of the market and pose 
barriers to entry. The findings show that there is a potential 
tension between the regulatory objectives of market stability 
and financial inclusion and that a disproportionate focus on 
either objective could adversely affect the other.
The research supports a consultative process requiring of 
industry to create a multi-stakeholder platform to facilitate 
exploring the uniqueness of the base of the pyramid to 
discover opportunities for cross-sector collaboration between 
the private and public sector to design innovative solutions. 
It also highlights the requirement for firms to collaborate 
with the regulator and each other via ASISA, to ensure that 
they are able to influence government to create policies that 
promote greater financial inclusion supported by outcomes-
based regulation. Considering that policy is driven at national 
level, data should be shared between the private and public 
sector, relying on ASISA to collate information and the FSB to 
facilitate the discussion. The results indicate a tendency on 
the part of industry to wait for regulatory signals, rather than 
proactively influencing government policy. This may be a 
product of the structure and mandate of the regulator and 
industry body and historic relationships between the 
regulator and industry. The results further reflect the need for 
industry, the regulator and government to co-frame issues 
rather than being obliged to rely on the FSB to draft regulation 
in isolation.
We argue that the entry level market may require a different 
paradigm to ‘usual’ insurance constructs. These constructs 
typically refer to products, structures and processes designed 
for the middle- to upper-income markets, which are at times 
inappropriate for the entry level market.
We conclude with a framework reflecting contextual 
factors that may influence the propensity of a regulator to 
expand its focus from its traditional constituency to include 
consumers who are excluded from regulatory provision, 
with practical implications for industry and policymakers 
(see Figure 2).
The block at the bottom left of Figure 2 indicates factors that 
may impact negatively on the propensity or willingness of 
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FIGURE 2: Conceptual framework of the interaction between industry and the 
regulator.
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the regulator to include consumers whose interests are not 
included in the regulatory focus. For instance, the gap 
between the regulator’s current market focus and the nature 
of the segment of the market that is currently excluded is 
relevant in this regard. Both the literature and results 
mentioned political uncertainty as a contextual factor, as it 
may possibly detract from the effectiveness of the government 
policy to increase inclusion. This refers to the general socio-
political state of the country with the premise that a more 
unsettled and distrusting industry may show less propensity 
to engage the regulator (or government) to consider inclusion 
of those who have been excluded.
The block at the bottom right of Figure 2 refers to factors that 
may accommodate greater interaction between the regulator 
and industry to include those who are peripheral to the 
current regulatory focus. The data showed that a proactive 
stance by industry is a positive contextual factor, 
accommodating inclusion. The extent to which the industry 
demonstrates an appetite to expand its focus to previously 
excluded or unregulated consumers within a market may 
influence the degree to which the industry and the regulator 
collaborate more effectively on the matter. Proactivity of the 
industry appears to be an important contributing factor, 
especially where the regulator does not take the initiative to 
give effect to the policy through practical and visible projects. 
This proactivity may be demonstrated through industry-
funded incubators, allowing for research of a sample of the 
market for experimental purposes. This must be conditional 
to complete and transparent regulatory oversight. To ensure 
compliance with competition regulation, these incubators or 
pilot exercises must be facilitated by the industry body and 
be representative of multiple firms to avoid the independence 
of the regulator being compromised. A further positive 
contextual factor lies in the ability and willingness of the 
regulator and industry to promote the effective information 
flow between each other, such as through secondment of 
employees. This will assist with the quality of information 
held by both firms and the regulator of each other and assist 
with engagement between them without compromising the 
independence of the regulator.
The top column of Figure 2 refers to the strategic measures 
that should be considered to improve the effectiveness of the 
collaboration between the various stakeholders to increase 
market inclusion and results in practical implications for the 
industry and policymakers. In essence, a multi-stakeholder 
charter is required that explicitly states the objectives of the 
stakeholders from which standards for the excluded market 
may be developed. The collaboration between the private 
and public sectors will contribute to the efficiency of 
government policy to facilitate regulatory inclusion. Research 
and the development of appropriate standards and regulation 
are resource-intensive operations. It is therefore imperative 
that the regulator have sufficient resources with the required 
experience and skill. Secondment of staff between the 
industry and the regulator, or appropriate internships and 
training, will assist in addressing this issue. Furthermore, 
pilot exercises could be conducted, utilising the information 
acquired through research. This may allow the industry to 
test-run products and processes subject to a less restrictive or 
rigorous regulatory process. This may be done in an effort to 
ascertain the appropriateness of the planned interventions, 
the cost implications for the industry and the time horizon to 
give effect to the policy.
The study is limited by its qualitative nature and is 
exploratory in purpose. Future quantitative research into the 
actual cost of compliance would better indicate the full effect 
of regulation on the industry and the implications thereof in 
relation to financial exclusion. Furthermore, a comparative 
study of the interaction between the regulator and the 
industry in emerging markets with sophisticated regulation 
and ‘unsophisticated’ consumers is proposed.
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